浙江財經大學金融學院舉行內源性借貸約束和財富的不平等講座，此次講座由王敏教授主講，浙江財經大學金融學院舉辦的此次在職研究生講座的主要內容是：

　　本文研究了貧富差距的一個經濟體與內源性借貸約束的演變。在該模型中的經濟，年輕的代理商需要貸款，以資助人力資本的投資，但不能承諾償還貸款。債權人可以通過從信貸市場永久驅逐他們的懲罰拖欠。在均衡狀態(tài)下，貸款違約防止被征收借款限額綁在借款人的遺產。在繼承的異質性轉化為異質性貸款限額：內源性，一些借款人面臨零借款限額;有些是部分受限，而另一些則不受約束。根據(jù)遺產的初次分配，有可能所有的系都吸引要么零借貸限制穩(wěn)態(tài)或無約束借款穩(wěn)態(tài) - 長期的平等。也可能有些譜系最終在一個穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)，其余的另 - 完整的兩極分化。

　　王敏教授在浙江大學農業(yè)經濟與管理系獲管理學碩士學位，隨后在愛荷華州立大學經濟系獲經濟學博士。發(fā)表的論文主要有《中國的高房價是否阻礙了創(chuàng)業(yè)？》、《能源體制改革：有效的市場，有為的政府》、《限購和房產稅對房價的影響：基于長期動態(tài)均衡的分析》等。

　　原文：This paper studies the evolution of wealth inequality in an economy with endogenous borrowing constraints. In the model economy, young agents need to borrow to finance human capital investments but cannot commit to repaying their loans. Creditors can punish defaulters by banishing them permanently from the credit market. In equilibrium, loan default is prevented by imposing a borrowing limit tied to the borrower's inheritance. The heterogeneity in inheritances translates into heterogeneity in the borrowing limits: endogenously, some borrowers face a zero borrowing limit; some are partly constrained, while others are unconstrained. Depending on the initial distribution of inheritances, it is possible all lineages are attracted to either the zero-borrowing-limit steady state or to the unconstrained-borrowing steady state -- long-run equality. It is also possible some lineages end up at one steady state and the rest at the other -- complete polarization.