長江商學(xué)院黃春燕在中國人民大學(xué)作了一場題為“優(yōu)化流動(dòng)性政策”的講座，中國人民大學(xué)“漢青經(jīng)濟(jì)與金融高級(jí)研究院”是中國人民大學(xué)順應(yīng)國際經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)科改革趨勢(shì)，建立的新型研究與教育基地。它將在新體制下融會(huì)國際師資、借鑒國外研究與教學(xué)模式，實(shí)現(xiàn)“放眼國際、立足本土”的辦學(xué)特色。在職課程培訓(xùn)班講座的主要內(nèi)容是：

　　本文提出的流動(dòng)性需求和供給的簡單模型。我們表明，競爭性市場力量未能導(dǎo)致流動(dòng)性的有效供應(yīng)，而效率低是目前無論是在事前市場設(shè)計(jì)和現(xiàn)貨市場的參與。因此，政策干預(yù)是必要的無論是在最初的市場設(shè)計(jì)階段，并在現(xiàn)貨市場，當(dāng)流動(dòng)性不足出現(xiàn)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，不同的政策干預(yù)有不同的市場條件下不同效率的后果。例如，雖然補(bǔ)貼流動(dòng)性提供事前(例如，指定做市商)一般是有效的，市場流動(dòng)性可能太高特別是當(dāng)流動(dòng)性事件的概率是小的;現(xiàn)貨干預(yù)措施，補(bǔ)貼銷售商(例如，放寬資本金要求，補(bǔ)貼貸款修改)通常是減少違約成本高于補(bǔ)貼購房者(如，公共和私營部門伙伴關(guān)系，以收購不良資產(chǎn))，尤其是補(bǔ)貼購房者在現(xiàn)場更有效市場可能會(huì)妨礙市場參與者的激勵(lì)機(jī)制，以提供流動(dòng)性的事前。

　　黃春燕博士現(xiàn)為長江商學(xué)院金融學(xué)教授。黃教授于2003年獲得麻省理工學(xué)院斯隆管理學(xué)院(MIT Sloan School of Management)金融學(xué)博士學(xué)位，并曾任德克薩斯大學(xué)奧斯汀分校(The University of Texas at Austin)金融學(xué)終身副教授，講授EMBA及博士學(xué)位的課程。她在稅收、資產(chǎn)流動(dòng)性、均衡資產(chǎn)定價(jià)，及基金管理等領(lǐng)域具有豐富的學(xué)術(shù)研究經(jīng)驗(yàn)。她曾在國際頂級(jí)期刊如Journal of Financial Economics、Journal of Finance、Review of Financial Studies、Journal of Public Economics等上發(fā)表多篇學(xué)術(shù)論文。

　　原文：This paper presents a simple model of liquidity demand and supply. We show that competitive market forces fail to lead to efficient supply of liquidity, and that the inefficiency is present both in ex ante market design and in spot market participation. Therefore, policy intervention is needed both at the initial market design stage and in the spot market when liquidity shortage arises. We show that different policy interventions have different efficiency consequences under different market conditions. For example, while subsidizing liquidity providers ex ante (e.g., designated market makers) is generally efficient, the market liquidity might be too high especially when the probability of liquidity event is small; spot interventions that subsidize sellers (e.g., relaxing capital requirements, subsidizing loan modifications) is generally more effective at reducing the cost of default than subsidizing buyers (e.g., public-private partnership to purchase toxic assets), especially since subsidization to buyers in the spot market might hinder the incentives of market participants to provide liquidity ex ante.