臺灣中央研究院研究院楊春雷博士在對外經濟貿易大學作了一場題為“自愿離職作為進行外部合作的一種制裁?”的講座，楊春雷博士畢業(yè)于德國Dortmund University，現任臺灣中央研究院研究員。他的研究興趣是微觀，博弈理論和實驗。他的研究成果發(fā)表在Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, European Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Experimental Economics等期刊上。此次講座的主要內容是：

　　如何激發(fā)合作伙伴，實現長期合作時，雙方有自由單方面終止的關系?在本文中，我們首先使用實驗室實驗來研究在自愿分開的重復囚徒困境博弈(VSRPD)合作怎么弄的。我們觀察到的行為模式，與出針鋒相對經常假設在文獻中不一致(Eeckhout，2006; Fugiwara - 格雷夫和奧野-Fugiwara，2009年，羅布和陽，2010)。在我們的實驗中，大多數球員寧愿留在他們背叛的合作伙伴，然后進行報復，在下列期間(S)。我們提出了一個所謂的親合作命題的命題，也是作為一類新的平衡點的稱為CD-隨遇平衡來解釋如何永恒的合作，可以與這些在實驗室中觀察到的行為特征來實現。使用根均方偏差測試表明，我們在VSRPD理論預先擬合數據比所有文獻中所討論的策略顯著更好。

　　原文：How do partners elicit and achieve long-term cooperation when both parties have the liberty to unilaterally terminate the relationship? In this paper, we first employ a laboratory experiment to investigate how cooperation comes about in a voluntarily separable repeated prisoner’s dilemma game (VSRPD). We observe behavioral patterns that are inconsistent with out-for-tat often assumed in the literature (Eeckhout, 2006; Fugiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fugiwara, 2009; Rob and Yang, 2010). In our experiment, most players prefer to stay with their defecting partners and then retaliate in the following period(s). We propose a proposition called Pro-Partnership Proposition as well as a new class of equilibria called CD-Indifferent Equilibrium to explain how eternal cooperation can be achieved with these behavioral traits observed in the lab. Tests using root-mean-squared deviations suggest that our advance in theory of VSRPD fit the data significantly better than all the strategies discussed in the literature.