講座題目：Delegated Bidder
報告人：鐘鴻鈞（牛津大學(xué)博士，上海財經(jīng)大學(xué)助教授）
地點：對外經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學(xué)博學(xué)樓1227
摘要: This paper investigates whether buyer has incentive to delegate its bidding to agent in English auctions. If bidders do not know which distribution their rivals are drawn from, then bidders may strategically reveal their distribution via delegation and influence rival’s behavior. We model the delegation decision as a signalling strategy through which strong bidders can strategically influence the participation decision of opponents. We characterize the equilibrium delegation decision and show that if the delegation cost is sufficient high, then there exists separating delegation equilibrium and super-mixing delegation equilibrium. If the delegation cost is moderate, then sub-mixing equilibrium exists. If the delegation cost is sufficiently small, then there exists only a pooling equilibrium. In all equilibria, the participation cost plays a key role in the deterrence of opponent’s entrance into the auction. We also examine the impact of delegation on efficiency.