北京大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院管漢暉副教授：北京大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院講師，主要研究方向：中國經(jīng)濟史國際經(jīng)濟學(xué)，在比較大學(xué)主要教授課程：中國經(jīng)濟史，經(jīng)濟學(xué)原理，銀行微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)，金融市場，商業(yè)銀行管理，等課程。

　　北京大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院管漢暉副教授在中國唐朝均田制，社會流動和官僚系統(tǒng)改造，在職研究生講座中指出：在帝制中國，這是世界上最早的官制度，也是西方國家的公務(wù)員制度的基礎(chǔ)上，公務(wù)員考試制度似乎在代替世襲制在唐朝(618-907)的。本次講座試圖對這一政治體制變革背后的經(jīng)濟驅(qū)動力。北京大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院管漢暉副教授發(fā)現(xiàn)，均田制的實施可以解釋為什么官僚體制變革發(fā)生在中國唐朝。長期實施均田制侵蝕貴族群體以及他們的壟斷政治權(quán)力的經(jīng)濟基礎(chǔ);因此，社會結(jié)構(gòu)變得比在貴族和世襲制度更高的水平。出于這個原因，貴族集團不得不與手段檢查，從而誘發(fā)官僚體制轉(zhuǎn)變，從大眾選擇的精英分享政治權(quán)力。利用新建的數(shù)據(jù)集從第一手傳記概率回歸提供了堅實的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)為我們的猜測，和IV估計驗證的關(guān)系是因果關(guān)系。我們的發(fā)現(xiàn)表明，只有當(dāng)經(jīng)濟因素徹底改變社會結(jié)構(gòu)，就可能導(dǎo)致重大的政治制度過渡。以下為原文。

　　The Civil Service Exam System in Imperial China, which is the earliest Official Selection System in the world, and also is foundation of the Civil Servant System of western countries, appeared in replace of the Hereditary System in Tang Dynasty (618-907). This paper seeks for the economic driving force behind this political institutions transformation. We find that the implementation of Land Equalization policy could explain why bureaucracy system transformation happened in Tang China. The long-term enforcement of Land Equalization policy eroded economic base of aristocrat groups as well as their monopoly political power; therefore, social structure became more horizontal than in the aristocrat and hereditary system. For this reason, the aristocrat groups had to share political power with elites selected from the populace by means of examination, which induced bureaucracy system transformation. Probit regression using a newly-constructed dataset from first-hand biographies provided solid empirical evidence for our conjectures, and IV estimation verifies that the relationship is causal. Our finding suggests that only if economic factor changed social structure thoroughly, it could lead to momentous political institution transition.